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The lessee in Hunt Trust v. Crowell Land & Mineral Corpora-
tion' paid cash for a lease and kept it alive under its terms for over
twenty years by paying one dollar per acre. The lease had a stipulated
term of twenty-five years and at the close of this period four wells
were producing on the property. Three more wells were completed
when suit was brought to have the lease declared terminated by
virtue of its twenty-five year term. The lease also contained the
production in paying quantities clause and was upheld by the inter-
pretation placed upon the lease by the majority of the court. The
Chief Justice dissented.
The alleged rule that leases must be construed most strongly
against the lessee was said by the court to be contrary to the articles
of the Civil Code and not to have been used in Louisiana decisions.
No discussion appears in regard to the long life of this lease
without use of the right to search but other cases with similar facts
have been grounded on doctrines of estoppel and ratification which
would seem to be applicable here on that point had it been raised.
Noxon v. Union Oil Company of California' ratifies the long
line of cases finding oil leases void when the instrument is unsup-
ported by consideration, penalty, or performance and the promise
to do depends solely on the will of the lessee. No new thoughts on
the potestative condition appear.
Lenard v. Shell Oil Company' was an action for slander of title
of a tract of land of which the plaintiff had possession as owner.
Plaintiff had maintained possession under the requisites of ac-
quirendi prescription for ten years. The defendants claimed the
mineral rights in the thirty acres in question under a reservation of
these rights from a sale of some eighty thousand acres of land. This
servitude had been kept alive by drilling wells which met the fair
test required for interruption by user.
The lower court and the supreme court rejected four pleas made
by plaintiff:
"(1) that it is against public policy to permit the reservation or
creation of a mineral servitude on so vast an area of land as
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 210 La. 945, 28 So. (2d) 669 (1946).
2. 210 La. 1074, 29 So. (2d) 67 (1946).
3. 211 La. 265, 29 So. (2d) 844 (1947).
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80,000 acres; (2) that the well drilled by the lessee, Zeigen,
which was commenced on December 20, 1935, was not drilled to
a depth sufficient to constitute evidence of good faith in the ex-
ercise of the mineral servitude reserved by the Louisiana Central
Lumber Company in its transfer of the land to the Brown Paper
Mill Company on March 15, 1926; (3) that the drilling of the
wells by the defendants or their lessees did not constitute an
exercise of their mineral servitude on the plaintiff's 30 acres of
land because the wells were drilled too far away to affect any
oil or gas that might be beneath the surface of the plaintiff's
30-acre tract; (4) that, even if the defendants acquired posses-
sion of the servitude or mineral rights on any portion of the
80,000 acres of land by the drilling of the wells referred to, they
did not acquire possession of the servitude or mineral rights on
the 30 acres of land owned by the plaintiff, because his possession
of the land itself existed from a time previous to the drilling of
the wells."4
Principles of indivisibility, continuous tract and fair tests were
set forth. As to the argument that maintenance of a servitude on
such a large tract was against public policy because it tended to keep
the mineral interests out of commerce the court said:
"On the contrary, as everyone knows, the production of mineral
oil or gas is such an expensive operation that it cannot be done
profitably on a small scale. No one would undertake to drill
for oil or gas in unproven territory-what is called a wildcat
well-without owning or controlling the mineral rights on a
vast area surrounding the prospective well."5
Cases in which servitudes on large tracts had been upheld were
cited. Thirty thousand acres were involved in Patton v. Frost
Lumber Industries.' Fifty-two thousand five hundred acres were
covered in Mt. Forest Fur Farms of America, Incorporated v.
Cockrell."
The lower court had decided in favor of the plaintiff on a fifth
point, namely, "that his possession of the surface of his 30 acres of
land gave him possession also of the mineral rights in the land,
notwithstanding the defendants' drilling operations on other parts
4. 211 La. 265, 271, 29 So. (2d) 844, 846.
5. 211 La. 265, 274, 29 So. (2d) 844, 847.
6. 176 La. 916, 922, 147 So. 88, 84 (1988).
7. 179 La. 795, 155 So. 228 (1984).
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of the large area covered by their servitude."' The supreme court
reversed on this ground and gave judgment for the defendants.
Reliance was placed upon Connell v. Muslow Oil Company, Allison
v. Maroun, ° In re Mi. Forest Fur Farms of America, Incorporated,"
International Paper Company v. Louisiana Central Lumber Com-
pany'2 the second paragraph of Article 3432 of the Civil Code which
appears as follows: "The possession of incorporeal rights, such as
servitudes and other rights of that nature, is only a quasi possession,
and is exercised by the species of possession of which these rights are
susceptible."
The first paragraph of Article 3432 states that "Possession applies
properly only to corporeal things, movable or immovable." Article
3436 of the Civil Code reads: "To be able to acquire possession of
property two distinct things are requisite:
1. The intention of possessing as owner.
2. The corporeal possession of the thing."
These statements and other pertinent articles dealing with pos-
session were not discussed.
Logical thought flows easily for the reader of the opinion until
the matter of possession of an incorporeal arises. To exercise a right
would seem to be a very different matter than to possess one in the
sense hitherto understood from previous examples. The converse
of this proposition is interesting. Could one acquire a mineral servi-
tude by possession evidenced by exercise of the right? Article 766
and all of the jurisprudence would seem clearly to answer. in the
negative.
Another question of interest was suggested which would have
arisen if the landowner had searched for himself. Oil is not a fruit
but an integral part of the land itself. That seems to be a settled
doctrine legally and geologically. Thus the landowner does possess
corporeally the minerals in his land and presumably the right to
search fbr them. The distinction between cases of acquisition and
non-acquisition by the landowner is grounded purely on non-exercise
versus exercise of the outstanding right. The court had to decide
and again they had the difficult task of having to attempt to store
safely new wine in old bottles.
8. 211 La. 265, 272, 29 So. (2d) 844, 846 (1947).
9. 186 La. 491, 172 So. 763 (1937).
10. 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408 (1939).
11. 122 F. (2d) 232 (C. C.A. 6th, 1941).
12. 202 La. 621, 12 So. (2d) 659 (1948).
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The facts in State v. Texas Company" were that an error in
description had been made by newspapers in a published notice
advertising for bids for a mineral lease from the state. None of the
parties relied upon the error and all proper procedures for leasing
state lands were observed. The governor corrected the error and it
is now pleaded that he had no power to do so under the doctrine of
State v. Texas Company.4 The cited case was distinguished as being
one where the "governor attempted to enlarge the area covered
under a lease by including therein property which had not been
advertised or described." In the instant case he merely corrected a
"simple clerical error,"" which, as Chairman Ex Officio of the
State Mineral Board, he had a right to do under the broad powers
of that Board as created by Act 93 of 1936.16
Continental Oil Company v. Tate7 arose as a concursus pro-
ceeding to determine distribution of royalty. Albert Tate had granted
a priest title to the land involved and had reserved certain royalty
to himself with recitation of one outstanding fraction. It developed
that other fractions had been sold by Tate so the question was
whether the unmentioned recorded sales should come out of Tate's
reserved portion or from that which would have passed to the priest.
The transfer from Tate, while framed as a sale, was found to have
been a gratuitous donation as the claims of the priest that the trans-
action had been to remunerate him failed. The court stated that
the nature of the services, undisclosed by the opinion, were "not
such as could be the consideration for a contract without violating
public policy-if not the law itself." The warranty in the transfer
being a part of the simulation and without consideration was not
binding on the transferor. Therefore, the previously sold fractions
were subtracted from the gift to the priest instead of from the reserve
of the donor. Had the transaction been an actual sale, the reverse
would have been true.
Davidson v. Midstates Oil Corporations decided that "an agree-
ment to purchase or sell oil, gas, and mineral leases must be in
writing"'9 and cannot be proved by parol evidence. Act 205 of 19382o
was cited. This statute declares that not only mineral leases but
18. 211 La. 826, 80 So. (2d) 107 (1947).
14. 205 La. 417, 17 So. (2d) 569 (1944).
15. 211 La. 326, 338, 80 So. (2d) 107, 111 (1947).
16. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4725.1 to 4725.21.
17. 211 La. 852, 30 So. (2d) 858 (1947).
18. 31 So. (2d) 7 (La. 1947).
19. 81 So. (2d) 7, 10.
20. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4785.4, 4785.5.
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"ocontracts applying to and affecting such leases" are "real rights
and incorporeal immovable property" which may be protected in the
same manner as land.
The very important question to be answered in Hunter Com-
pany, Incorporated v. Shell Oil Company, Incorporated' was clearly
set forth in the opinion as follows:
"When an oil and gas lease covers land both within and
without a drilling unit pooled by order of the Commissioner of
Conservation during the primary term of such lease, and when
production in paying quantities is secured while such lease is
in effect by payment of delay rentals from a well within the
pooled unit but not on any portion of the leased land, does
such production maintain the lease in effect beyond its primary
term as to the part of the land leased which lies outside such
unit?",22
The majority opinion answered this question in the affirmative.
The court seemed to ground their decision on the principle of the
indivisibility of the obligations of a lease, which the division of the
land covered by the lease accomplished by the Commissioner's order
did not affect. A further statement was made that the same royalties
were received from the well without the boundaries of the lease but
within the unit as would have been due had the well been drilled
upon the leased land, so the production clause had been satisfied.
Justice Hamiter vigorously dissented from these views and also from
the refusal to grant a rehearing. In his opinion, he pointed out that
the technical matter of indivisibility as a criteria resulted in an
interpretation of the commissioner's order which had not been in-
tended and as applied was unconstitutional as it effected a depriva-
tion of property without due process or consideration. He stated
that:
"Under such an interpretation, the present lessees would
hold under lease indefinitely plaintiff's acreage located outside
the unit without the payment therefor of any royalty or other
compensation, not even delay rentals, notwithstanding that the
contracted primary terms of the leases have expired."''
It appeared that the conservation department had not indeed
intended this type of result from the order and also that they were
21. 81 So. (2d) 10 (La. 1947).
22. 81 So. (2d) 10, 12.
23. 81 So. (2d) 10, 15.
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aware of the probable reactions. They were quick to suggest at the
meeting of the Mineral Section of the Louisiana Bar Association
meeting in session immediately after the issuance of the decision in
this case that remedial legislation should be passed. The following
passage from the dissenting opinion is interesting:
"My views accord thoroughly with the following observations
contained in the brief of plaintiff's counsel: 'The only basis
for sustaining these Conservation Orders is that they are fair
and reasonable and do justice and equity to all parties concerned.
Under the defendant's contention, if a lease contained 1000 acres
and only one acre happened to be placed within a unit and no
well was drilled on that particular acre, nevertheless, the entire
1000 acres would be held indefinitely beyond the primary term
but would share in only 1/640 x 1/8, or 1/5120th of the produc-
tion from the unit. Such a result as this makes it obvious that
neither the Legislature nor the Commissioner intended any
such thing.' "24
The court suggested that the lessors might find relief under the
development clause, an expensive and circuitous route to an end
which in the writer's judgment might well have been accomplished




The good faith of the wife in an alleged putative marriage was
at issue in Succession of Chavis.1 Counsel contended the wife had
not been in good faith at the time of the marriage because she knew
of the husband's previous marriage, had only his statement that he
had been divorced, and had failed to investigate the truth or falsity
of this statement. In an extremely well considered opinion, adopted
and quoted by the supreme court, the trial judge declared that the
extent of the obligation to investigate "to ascertain whether there
exists any legal impediment ...will depend upon the facts and
circumstances in each individual case." The relative (and subjective)
quality of good faith is noted and the manner in which a trial judge
24. 81 So. (2d) 10, 17.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 818, 29 So. (2d) 860 (1947).
